
Explores the international politics of threat, or, deterrence.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Schelling#Notable_works
There are footnotes in "The Strategy of Conflict" containing more profound insight than whole books that are published today.
On this particular topic though "Strategy and Arms Control" is the one to go for.
He has, for example, an interesting discussion showing how having less information about one's opponent or less freedom of decision can actually put that party in a stronger position.
I don't have a youtube video for you, but I do have a book recommendation: Thomas Schelling's "The Strategy of Conflict" from 1960.
The writing is extremely clear and accessible, by the standards of nobel-prize-winning economists.
But ok. Let's dig into this
"We can apply this concept of suspicion to the phenomenon in the field of modern artificial intelligence research. In AI research, some researchers believe that humans should pause the development of AI technology because of the potential unforeseeable risks it may bring."
An analogy would be that some of the scientists involved with the Manhattan project (see Szilárd petition) attempted to file an official protest against the use of nuclear weapons against civilian population and arguing that the weapons constructed were too dangerous to be a part of an arms race and should be placed under an international control body.
"However, another group of researchers believe that we should not stop because we cannot be certain whether those who are trying to catch up with us will use the advancement of AI technology as a hidden weapon."
Researchers are not decision makers in this or any other scenario. AI technology as a weapon? Sure but unless you are Bombs Away LeMay circa 1961 this really isn't a winnable or even useful use case. We're still in a blue sky phase. The fun thing about nuclear weapons is that if any nation feels that another is pulling too far ahead they can be used as a way to push for bi/multilateral discussions and eventually treaties limiting the production and/or deployment of weapons that risk of increasing tensions/lethality and so on . (see SALT I/II and START etc)
"This suspicion leads to a chain reaction, where people continue to worry about each other's motives and abilities, making it difficult for all parties to establish trust. Therefore, although there are good intentions, such proposals are unlikely to be implemented."
Again... read Schelling... this is just nonsense.
There are treaties in place for retaliation, but no such treaty existed for Ukraine.
A good book on these games is Strategy of Conflict.
For a great introduction from this point of view, check out Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict. No maths, just a great read from a Nobel prize winner.