The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind
At the heart of this classic, seminal book is Julian Jaynes's still-controversial thesis that human consciousness did not begin far back in animal evolution but instead is a learned process that came about only three thousand years ago and is still developing. The implications of this revolutionary scientific paradigm extend into virtually every aspect of our psychology, our history and culture, our religion -- and indeed our future.
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- It looks very much like it: Julian James, 'The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind' (see [1]), which influenced Neal Stephenson's writing of Snow Crash.
Scott Alexander wrote a critique of it beginning "Julian Jaynes’ The Origin Of Consciousness In The Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind is a brilliant book, with only two minor flaws. First, that it purports to explains the origin of consciousness. And second, that it posits a breakdown of the bicameral mind. I think it’s possible to route around these flaws while keeping the thesis otherwise intact..." [2]. A response (which I have not yet read) can be found here [3].
[1] https://www.julianjaynes.org/about/about-jaynes-theory/overv...
[2] https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-...
[3] https://www.julianjaynes.org/2023/09/04/fact-checking-scott-...
- Shoutout for Jaynes! I used to call it my "buck twenty-five" book because if anyone ever tried to get pretentious with me I'd steer the conversation to an opening to bring up "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" and shut them down :-)
Also, I got my copy signed by Jaynes back in the '80s
- I don't quite remember the details, but there's a fascinating section in Julian Jaynes's "Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" where he talks about how metaphors condense down into more complex forms, and as they do they unlock new realities previously impossible to fathom. The classical example here is the simultaneous discovery of calculus by Newton and Leibniz: the larger context defines what is possible.
I was recently running myself through a thought experiment similar to the author here: if LLMs truly do make generation of ideas cheap (I'm still a skeptic here even within software), then as soon as products enter the public awareness they become trivial to reproduce. For example, in a prompt like: "Uber but for babysitters," "Uber for" is doing a tremendous amount of work. Before Uber, its model, UX, modes of engagement would've taken pages and pages to describe, but after, it becomes comparatively much cheaper.
... in this way, LLMs could cheapen ideas and creativity so much that they make other factors (which are already the weighing functions) more important, and I think the imbalance here is deeply troubling. Those factors are namely network effects (existing customers, brand recognition, existing relationships, capital). And when balance is shifted more toward network effects, it means that the whole system becomes more brittle because it makes it even harder to boot out incumbents.
There are a whole slew of issues with LLMs, particularly around their intended devaluation of labor, and we aren't talking enough about them.
- Missing The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind by Julian Jaynes. Mind fucked…
- To this list I would absolutely add Julian Jaynes' "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind."
> simulations of conscious thought entirely via prediction language tokens
Jaynes goes so far as to assert that language generates consciousness, which is characterized by (amongst other features) its narrative structure, as well as its production of a metaphor of our selves that can inhabit a spatiotemporal mental space that serves as an analog for the physical world; the mental space where we imagine potential actions, play with ideas, predict future outcomes, and analyze concepts prior to taking action in the "real, actual" world.
The generation of metaphors is inextricably linked to the psychotechnology (to pull a word from vocabulary discussed by John Vervaeke in his "Awakening from the Meaning Crisis" series) of language, which is the means by which one object can be described and elaborated by its similarity to another. As an etymological example: the Sanskrit word "bhu" which means "to grow" forms the basis of the modern English verb "to be," but predates lofty abstract notions such as that of "being," "ontology," or "existence." It's from the known and the familiar (plant or animal growth) that we can reach out into the unknown and the unfamiliar (the concept of being), using (psycho-)technologies such as language to extend our cognition in the same way a hammer or a bicycle extends our body.
There is something here about language being the substrate of thought, and perhaps even consciousness in general as Jaynes would seem to assert in Book I of his 1976 work, where he spends a considerable amount of time discussing metaphor and language in connection to his definition of "consciousness."
There are also questions of "intentionality" and whether or not computers and their internal representations can actually be "about" something in the way that our language and our ideas can be "about" something in the physical (or even ideal) world that we want to discuss. Searle and the "Chinese room" argument come to mind.
Turing famously dodged this question in his paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" by substituting what is now called the "Turing test" in lieu of answering the question of whether or not "machines" can "think" (whatever those two words actually mean).
- I'm reading this book "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" and it's quite fascinating to think deeply about what is Consciousness. I think the book does a good job of defining and explaining Consciousness.
Highly recommend it to think critically about the subject, but I think your point is valid, consciousness occurs for many things, and then it doesn't have to many other things. You don't need consciousness to nearly instantly detect that b comes after a sequence of {a,b,a,b,a,?}. You need consciousness to think about _why_ b comes after though. When you go for a swim and then recall the event, you most likely recall it in an objective or third person way mentally - the image or visual in your memory is that third person view.. but that's not actually how you experienced it.
I wonder how much of that applies to animals, and I wonder if we can ever get that answer.
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