Inside the Soviet Army
This book describes the general organization, doctrine, and strategy of the Soviet armed forces. It includes vast array of topics, ranging from the organizational structure of the armed forces in peace and war to personal reminiscences about life in the barracks and officers' clubs. The term 2Army3 in the title covers not only the land forces, but also strategic rocket, air, and naval forces. Much of what Mr. Suvorov writes about Soviet military affairs tallies with the conclusions reached in Western analyses.
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- Great find, thanks!
Some of his other works are also worth reading:
'Inside the Soviet Army': http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/index.html
One excerpt:
> The winter of 1969 was an exceptionally bitter one in the Soviet Far East. When the first clashes with the Chinese took place on the river Ussuri, and before combat divisions reached the area, the pressure exerted by the enemy was borne by the KGB frontier troops. After the clash was over, the General Staff held a careful investigation into all the mistakes and oversights which had occurred. It was quickly discovered that several KGB soldiers had frozen to death in the snow, simply because they had never received elementary instruction in sleeping out in temperatures below zero.
> This was alarming news. A commission from the General Staff immediately carried out experiments with three divisions, chosen at random, and came to a depressing conclusion. Wartime experience had been irrevocably lost and the modern Soviet soldier had not been taught how he could sleep in the snow. Naturally he was not allowed a sleeping bag and of course he was forbidden to light a fire. Normally a soldier would spend nights when the temperature was below freezing-point in his vehicle. But what was he to do if the vehicle was put out of action?
> The chiefs of staff of all divisions were immediately summoned to Moscow. They were given a day's instruction in the technique of sleeping out in snow at freezing temperatures, using only a greatcoat. Then each of them was required to convince himself that this was possible, by sleeping in the snow for three nights. (It should be remembered that March in Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, is a hard month, with snow on the ground and temperatures below zero.) Then the chiefs of staff returned to their divisions and immediately the entire Soviet Army was put to a very hard test-that of spending a night in the open in numbing cold and without any extra clothing. It seemed as if those who were stationed in deserts in the south were in luck. But no-they were sent by turns to either Siberia or the north to be put through the same tough training. Thereafter, spending a night in the snow became a part of all military training programmes.
'Inside Soviet Military Intelligence': http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/index.html About the GRU.
'Spetsnaz. The Story Behind the Soviet SAS': http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov6/index.html Excerpt talking about the importance of a spade:
> Every infantryman in the Soviet Army carries with him a small spade. When he is given the order to halt he immediately lies flat and starts to dig a hole in the ground beside him. In three minutes he will have dug a little trench 15 centimetres deep, in which he can lie stretched out flat, so that bullets can whistle harmlessly over his head. The earth he has dug out forms a breastwork in front and at the side to act as an additional cover. If a tank drives over such a trench the soldier has a 50% chance that it will do him no harm. At any moment the soldier may be ordered to advance again and, shouting at the top of his voice, will rush ahead. If he is not ordered to advance, he digs in deeper and deeper. At first his trench can be used for firing in the lying position. Later it becomes a trench from which to fire in the kneeling position, and later still, when it is 110 centimetres deep, it can be used for firing in the standing position. The earth that has been dug out protects the soldier from bullets and fragments. He makes an embrasure in this breastwork into which he positions the barrel of his gun. In the absence of any further commands he continues to work on his trench. He camouflages it. He starts to dig a trench to connect with his comrades to the left of him. He always digs from right to left, and in a few hours the unit has a trench linking all the riflemen's trenches together. The unit's trenches are linked with the trenches of other units. Dug-outs are built and communication trenches are added at the rear. The trenches are made deeper, covered over, camouflaged and reinforced. Then, suddenly, the order to advance comes again. The soldier emerges, shouting and swearing as loudly as he can.
> The infantryman uses the same spade for digging graves for his fallen comrades. If he doesn't have an axe to hand he uses the spade to chop his bread when it is frozen hard as granite. He uses it as a paddle as he floats across wide rivers on a telegraph pole under enemy fire. And when he gets the order to halt, he again builds his impregnable fortress around himself. He knows how to dig the earth efficiently. He builds his fortress exactly as it should be. The spade is not just an instrument for digging: it can also be used for measuring. It is 50 centimetres long. Two spade lengths are a metre. The blade is 15 centimetres wide and 18 centimetres long. With these measurements in mind the soldier can measure anything he wishes.
> The infantry spade does not have a folding handle, and this is a very important feature. It has to be a single monolithic object. All three of its edges are as sharp as a knife. It is painted with a green matt paint so as not to reflect the strong sunlight.
> The spade is not only a tool and a measure. It is also a guarantee of the steadfastness of the infantry in the most difficult situations. If the infantry have a few hours to dig themselves in, it could take years to get them out of their holes and trenches, whatever modern weapons are used against them.
- This put me in mind of a passage from the (excellent) 1982 book Inside the Soviet Army, by the Soviet defector Vladimir Rezun (which can be read in English in its entirety here: http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/index.html), which explained why ammunition for Soviet weapons hadn't been standardized across a common set of calibers:
The calibre of the standard Soviet infantry weapon is 7.62mm. In 1930, a 7.62mm `TT' pistol was brought into service, in addition to the existing rifles and machine-guns of this calibre. Although their calibre is the same, the rounds for this pistol cannot, of course, be used in either rifles or machine-guns.
In wartime, when everything is collapsing, when whole Armies and Groups of Armies find themselves encircled, when Guderian and his tank Army are charging around behind your own lines, when one division is fighting to the death for a small patch of ground, and others are taking to their heels at the first shot, when deafened switchboard operators, who have not slept for several nights, have to shout someone else's incomprehensible orders into telephones-in this sort of situation absolutely anything can happen. Imagine that, at a moment such as this, a division receives ten truckloads of 7.62mm cartridges. Suddenly, to his horror, the commander realises that the consignment consists entirely of pistol ammunition. There is nothing for his division's thousands of rifles and machine-guns and a quite unbelievable amount of ammunition for the few hundred pistols with which his officers are armed.
I do not know whether such a situation actually arose during the war, but once it was over the `TT' pistol-though not at all a bad weapon-was quickly withdrawn from service. The designers were told to produce a pistol with a different calibre. Since then Soviet pistols have all been of 9mm calibre. Why standardise calibres if this could result in fatally dangerous misunderstanding?
Ever since then, each time an entirely new type of projectile has been introduced, it has been given a new calibre...
[West Germany and France] have excellent 120mm mortars and both are working on the development of new 120mm tank guns... [W]hat happens if, tomorrow, middle-aged reservists and students from drama academies have to be mobilised to defend freedom? What then? Every time 120mm shells are needed, one will have to explain that you don't need the type which are used by recoilless guns or those which are fired by mortars, but shells for tank guns. But be careful-there are 120mm shells for rifled tank guns and different 120mm shells for smoothbore tank guns. The guns are different and their shells are different. What happens if a drama student makes a mistake?
The Soviet analysts sit and scratch their heads as they try to understand why it is that Western calibres never alter.
(This specific chapter can be read here: http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/06.html)
- This translation of Suvorov's "Inside the soviet army" was a real treat to a history buff
http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/index.html
Actually quite topical given russias recent escapades - this details pretty well the society and the power dynamics that gave birth to the current situation. Also reads like an alternate version of "Catch-22" except the content should be 100% autobiographical.
- You will be tempted to tell them about things that you hope will happen (e.g. “I think we’re going to be able to get you a nice raise this year”) Don’t do it. Either it won’t come through and they’ll be disappointed, or it will come through and they will have gotten their hopes up for even more.
I read a good book once by a defector from the Soviet military, explaining the lessons he'd learned as an officer on the other side of the iron curtain (this one: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inside_the_Soviet_Army).
In it he described one thing he'd learned about how to lead people:
Always try to remember the golden rule of controlling others -- NEVER PROMISE ANYONE ANYTHING! If you are able to do something for another person -- do it, without having made any promises.
From this first rule there follows a second -- NEVER THREATEN ANYONE!
You can punish someone and, if you consider it necessary, you should do so. But promises and threats simply weaken your authority as a commander.
(The full text of that chapter from the book is here: http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/08.html)
This is true in civilian life, too. Promises and threats are just wind that people blow when they can't do what they really want to do. Leaders with real power don't threaten to fire someone; they just fire them. They don't promise to give raises; they just give them.
People understand this, and if you lean on promises and threats, it makes them subconsciously evaluate you as weak, ineffectual. Someone who it's not really necessary to listen to.
- I saw Russians depicted as drinking brake fluid in Beast of War and couldn't believe it. A few searches proved it true!
Here's an excerpt from "Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan" by Alexander Alexiev (US Army document):
You cannot imagine what they drink. They will drink shaving lotions and cologne. That's good stuff. Then they will drink toothpaste. The best one is the Bulgarian Pomorin brand. They will simply squeeze four or five tubes in a jar, dilute it with water and drink it. They also drank truck antifreeze, glue, and brake fluid. The brake fluid they used to heat up and put some nails in it for some reason. I don't know why. They will also take shoe polish and smear it on a piece of bread and leave it in the sun until the alcohol separates from the shoe polish. Then you eat the bread and get drunk.
- Oh yeah the reports about Russian army from beginning of war in Ukraine read like someone copying his book Inside the Soviet Army. Which in turn reads like stories you heard about the Soviets in WW2.
