
> Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Aristotle’s Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science. Among the many topics covered are the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of evolution; and neuroscientific reductionism. The book interacts heavily with the literature on these issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, so as to bring contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition.
* https://www.editiones-scholasticae.de/index.php?page=shop.pr...
* https://www.amazon.com/Aristotles-Revenge-Metaphysical-Found...
He regularly posts on his weblog, including rebuttals to any critiques on his work where he thinks there is errors:
Some would disagree:
> Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Aristotle's Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science.
* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/43277412-aristotle-s-rev...
* https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/causality-and-radio...
The book Aristotle's Revenge has "§5.2 Aristotle and quantum mechanics" as well per the table of contents (been a few years since I read it):
* https://www.editiones-scholasticae.de/artikel/aristotles-rev...
"Something like this view is defended by philosophers such as James Ladyman and Don Ross in their book 'Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized', and by the physicist Max Tegmark. I have a lot to say about Ladyman and Ross’s project in the forthcoming 'Aristotle’s Revenge'[1], all of it critical. Suffice it for present purposes to note that this sort of view essentially identifies the physical world with a kind of Platonic abstract object. Ladyman and Ross try to deal with this problem by denying that there is a clear distinction between abstract and concrete. As I argue in the book, this position is incoherent and the arguments for it are entirely question-begging. Moreover, even apart from that it doesn’t really solve the problem at all, because (as the Aristotelian would argue) Platonism itself essentially blurs the distinction between the abstract and the concrete. For a Platonic Form is characterized both as a universal (and hence as abstract) and as a substance (and hence as concrete). To blur the abstract/concrete distinction is to fall deeper into Platonism, rather than to avoid it."
[0] https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/01/materialism-subvert...
