The Guardian Project builds open-source, privacy-focused mobile apps and tools such as Orbot, ChatSecure, Haven and PanicKit.
Commenters like its apps and install them first on a new Android phone; they cite it as a reason to pick Android and praise Haven as a baby monitor.
OStel.co does address this - we are specifically trying to lay out how a privacy-first, security by design VOIP service should be run. We are taking stock, off-the-shelf open-source software, and figuring out the best configuration for it to be run in order to store as little data as possible. We are also thinking about how we can defend against tracking of signaling information - by perhaps running the SIP/TLS portion over Tor.
You can read about this and more on some of our posts on the Guardian Project blog:
http://guardianproject.info/2013/06/12/carrier-grade-verizon-and-the-nsa/
http://guardianproject.info/2013/01/31/anonymous-cb-radio-with-mumble-and-tor/
http://guardianproject.info/2012/12/10/voice-over-tor/
https://guardianproject.info/2013/02/22/lower-bounds-of-the-narrow-bands/
TextSecure/Signal - https://whispersystems.org/blog/bithub/
I couldn't find any USD donation button, which is quite strange. They also don't have a donate button on their site. You can donate here, though, and to a few other projects, too:
https://freedom.press/bundle/encryption-tools-journalists
There's also these guys here - but I couldn't find any donate button. Jesus, why are they making it so hard to give them money?
https://guardianproject.info/
OTR - https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/donate.php
You could also donate EFF, which is funding some cool projects such as HTTPS Everywhere, Privacy Badger and soon the free certificate authority https://letsencrypt.org/.
https://supporters.eff.org/donate
Tox - open source Skype alternative: https://donate.tox.im/
> - They claim federation is impossible… yet matrix has it.
I believe the claim was that it's hard to adapt to changing markets and be federated [1]. Comparing Signal's market share to Matrix's is obviously not a direct cause-and-effect, but Matrix hasn't yet proven that you can get mass adoption that way.
> - They claim openness but are actively hostile to linux distributions and f-droid.
I'm too lazy to find the specific GitHub comment, but IIRC there was a specific list of features they'd need to actively support F-Droid. It is now available in the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository though [2].
[1] https://signal.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/
[2] https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.thoughtcrime.securesms/
I don't have favorites, but Spritely is definitely an equal favorite for the projects we support at the Filecoin Foundation for the Decentralized Web. Others HNers may also be interested in include:
* Internet Archive's Democracy's Library https://blog.archive.org/2022/10/19/announcing-democracys-library/
* Distributed Press
https://distributed.press/
* Guardian Project
https://guardianproject.info/
* MuckRack Document Cloud
https://muckrack.com/
* Harvard Library Innovation Lab
https://lil.law.harvard.edu/
* Human Rights Data Analysis Group
https://hrdag.org/data-publication/
Longer list here: https://ffdweb.org/explore/#partners
The companies/apps are here:
https://www.eyewitness.global/
https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.witness.proofmode/
I think all these are really doing is ensuring an image isn't modified. Signing/Creating a hash of the image and metadata (timestamp and perhaps location) means that a change after that can be detected. If you trust the people making the apps - or perhaps the companies running repositories they use - you could then trust that the photo was taken because the app is signing it when it is taken. Ensuring when and where the photo was taken does seem harder to prove as the time and location of the device can be fooled.
The analogy is one of defense in depth: if you're serious about security, you can use memorized & typed secondary passwords on secure apps, such as secure notes in 1Password, or an app like https://guardianproject.info/apps/pixelknot/ that would steganographically encode secure notes into otherwise normal photos, potentially with independent passwords for complete deniability.
A locked door and a face-locked iPhone are only the first line of defense, and are largely for convenience's sake in both daily use/as a deterrent and in the case of physically being distant from your property. The "guns" are entirely independent.