Micromotives and Macrobehavior

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1. cmaJan 2025
   This is a really good book about all kinds of similar situations:

   Thomas Schelling: Micromotives and Macrobehavior

   https://www.amazon.com/Micromotives-Macrobehavior-Thomas-C-S...

   "In one famous example, Thomas C. Schelling shows that a slight-but-not-malicious preference to have neighbors of the same race eventually leads to completely segregated populations."

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2. acslater00Mar 2012
   As it happens, I studied traffic flow back when I was an undergrad in the context of "agent based modeling".

   Agent-based models are basically computer simulations where you throw N 'agents' into an environment with pre-defined rules and then watch how they interact with each other. This setup lends itself perfectly to vehicle-flow; each agent is a car, each car has a model for when it accelerates, when it slows down, when it turns, and so forth. Create enough of them, and you can start to simulate traffic jams and other interesting traffic phenomena.

   Now, I have not studied this problem in particular. My research was on the effect of excessive lane-changing on overall traffic throughput (Spoiler: lane-changing tends to cause traffic to slow down behind the lane-changer, which means that system-wide lane-changing leads to traffic jams, but changing lanes is a strictly superior strategy for individual drivers in most situations. The classic collective-action problem. Economics!)

   However, it seems to me that it would be relatively simple to extend a traditional AB traffic model to include special vehicles that impose constraints on nearby cars.

   If any of you are interested, there is an excellent java library developed at UChicago called Repast [http://repast.sourceforge.net/index.html] which contains a framework for building agent-based models.

   You may also be interested in my favorite book on the subject, "Micromotives and Macrobehavior" [http://www.amazon.com/Micromotives-Macrobehavior-Lectures-Pu...] which is more rigorous than its Amazon description would have you believe.

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3. cmaOct 2010
   This is covered in Micromotives and Macrobehavior, in a section dealing with clubs/meetings/etc.

   http://www.amazon.com/Micromotives-Macrobehavior-Lectures-Pu...

   A similar book focused solely on online phenomena would rock.

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4. skmurphyMar 2008
   in no particular order:

   Myers-Brigs Model for Personality

   "Four Steps to the Epiphany" by Steve Blank

   John Boyd's OODA Loop as a model for competitive decision making

   Decision Analysis techniques: in particular decision trees, expected value of perfect information, and good decision bad outcome

   BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) concept for negotiation planning

   "Secrets of Consulting" by Gerald M. Weinberg

   "Bionomics" by Michael Rothschild

   SimCity computer game

   Analysis of Competing Hypotheses methodology

   wiki (social process) model for small team collaborative document development

   community of practice model for knowledge management

   "The Moon is a Harsh Mistress" by Robert Heinlein (in particular TANSTAAFL)

   activation energy, catalyst, and phase change concepts from physics/chemistry

   Amplify Positive Deviance model from Jerry Sternin (Save the Children)

   "The Empowered Manager" by Peter Block, in particular his trust vs. agreement matrix

   "Crossing the Chasm" & "Inside the Tornado" by Geoffrey Moore

   "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" by William Lind

   "Change Your Brain, Change Your Life" by Daniel Amen

   "Micromotives and Macrobehavior" by Thomas Schelling

   Appreciative Inquiry Techniques

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5. jwardenAug 2024
   Very interesting strategy.

   Unfortunately, I think this is not an equilibrium strategy. An equilibrium strategy profile is one where, given everyone is using that strategy, no single individual cannot profitably deviate. But if I know everyone else in the class is going to use this strategy, and I draw the short straw (and assuming for simplicity that nobody else can draw the short straw), then I know everybody else will answer 10, and I maximize my chance of winning by choosing x such that ((n-1)10 + x) / n) + 10 = x.

   But I wonder if this or a similar strategy would provide the maximum expected reward for the

   group*. In that case, then there's a situation that is somewhat like a multi-player prisoner's dilemma, in that if everybody always "cooperated", they'd all be better off in the long run. Yet whoever draws the short straw is better off not cooperating. Therefore nobody cooperates.

   In the case of repeated one-on-one games (where you play the same game with the same player multiple times), there is a solution to the prisoner's dilemma: strategies like "tit for tat" where you can essentially punish people for non-cooperation (as described in fantastic classic "The Evolution of Cooperation" by Robert Axelrod). But since there are multiple people in the class, this is more like a a multi-player prisoners dilemma (as described by Thomas Schelling in "Micromotives and Macrobehavior"), or a "collective action" problem. These can also be solved if you go "outside" the game and have systems for punishing people who don't cooperate (e.g. union members beating up scabs).

   Another thing about Schelling points: a "strategy" can be a Schelling point. It is unlikely that the whole class would independently do the same analysis and come up with the same strategy (even if it was an equilibrium strategy). But if you stood up before the class and explained the strategy before the exam, it would become a Schelling point.

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6. guillaume8375Dec 2016
   Thomas Schelling was the author of Micromotives and Macrobehavior and The Strategy of Conflict.
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