Skip to content
HomeVideosBooksBlogs
AllTop postsTopics
Podcasts
HistoryListsWatch laterLiked videosFollowing

The videos, books, blogs and podcasts Hacker News keeps recommending, all in one place.

VideosBooksBlogsPodcastsAboutPrivacySettings

Data from Hacker News, HackerTube, HackerBooks, HackerBlogs and Open Library. Credits · Not affiliated with Y Combinator.

HomeVideosBooksBlogsPodcasts
Ctrl K
    K

    Kangjie Lu

    www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu · Personal blog · on HN since 2018

    Kangjie Lu, a University of Minnesota computer science researcher, hosts papers and statements on the "hypocrite commits" Linux kernel study.

    Visit blogHN submissions
    SecurityOpen Source & LinuxScience
    What HN says

    HN links it for the authors' FAQ and clarifications, which commenters quote and dispute, noting a gap between the claims and the controversy.

    Stats for nerds
    39HN people shared it
    6linked in comments
    33story points
    Apr 2021last shared

    Top posts on HN

    1. 1
      Precise and Scalable Detection of Double-Fetch Bugs in OS Kernels [pdf]
      1 person · 16 points · first shared 2018 · Discussion on HN
    2. 2
      “Hypocrite commit” paper withdrawal from IEEE Security and Privacy 2021 [pdf]
      3 people · 9 points · first shared 2021 · Discussion on HN
    3. 3
      A Full Disclosure of the Case Study of the “HypocriteCommits” Paper [pdf]
      2 people · 5 points · first shared 2021 · Discussion on HN
    4. 4
      Clarifications on the “hypocrite commit” work (FAQ) [pdf]
      25 people · 2 points · first shared 2021 · Discussion on HN
    5. 5
      Fuzzing Error Handling Code Using Context-Sensitive Software Fault Injection [pdf]
      1 person · 1 points · first shared 2020 · Discussion on HN
    6. 6
      Homepage
      9 people · first shared 2021
    7. 7
      Eecatch.pdf
      1 person · first shared 2021

    What HN people wrote when they linked it

    • jimsugApr 2021

      > We just want you to know that we would never intentionally hurt the Linux kernel community and never introduce security vulnerabilities. Our work was conducted with the best of intentions and is all about finding and fixing security vulnerabilities.

      Either this is a bald-faced lie or they didn't think through the implications of their research, neither of which bode well for their trustworthiness in future. However, if it's the latter, then they possibly deserve additional leeway.

      On the other hand, I wonder whether this letter would have eventuated without the ban - if not, then they've likely been forced to write it, in which case any remorse is either selfish (i.e. they've been professionally reprimanded and feel bad about getting caught, or making such an egregious error in judgement), or hollow.

      > I agree, but let's give them a little extra benefit of the doubt. I thought as I was reading it that it seemed stilted and forced, then I wondered if the author(s) don't speak / write English as a primary language.

      https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/

      It looks like you might be right about this, but I think that reading it as stilted and forced is still accurate.

    • karsinkkApr 2021

      Here's a clarification from the Researchers over at UMN[1].

      They claim that none of the Bogus patches were merged to the Stable code line :

      >Once any maintainer of the community responds to the email,indicating “looks good”,we immediately point out the introduced bug and request them to not go ahead to apply the patch. At the same time, we point out the correct fixing of the bug and provide our proper patch. In all the three cases, maintainers explicitly acknowledged and confirmed to not move forward with the incorrect patches. This way, we ensure that the incorrect patches will not be adopted or committed into the Git tree of Linux.

      I haven't been able to find out what the 3 patches which the reference are, but the discussions on Greg's UMN Revert patch [2] does indicate that some of the fixes have indeed been merged to Stable and are actually Bogus.

      [1] : https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf

      [2] : https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org/

    • ondrekApr 2021

      I asked Kangjie Lu to explain the original complain. Here is his reply from Wednesday:

      —-

      Thanks for sharing.

      The statements in the link are wrong. I will make some clarifications.

      1. We have never intentionally introduced any bugs in Linux.
      2. The project that investigated the issues with OSS patching process was done in November 2020. We did get an IRB letter for the research. The purpose of the research is to improve the security of the OSS patching process.
      3. One of my students is working on a different project which has nothing to do with the project mentioned in 2. The student aims to fix problems in Linux instead of introducing problems.

      If you are interested in the project mentioned in 2, please find more details here: https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf

      I hope these clarify the misunderstandings.

      Kangjie Lu
      Assistant Professor
      Department of Computer Science and Engineering
      University of Minnesota
      https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu

      —-

    • wolverine876Apr 2021

      They did not secretly introduce exploitable bugs:

      Once any maintainer of the community responds to the email,indicating “looks good”,we immediately point out the introduced bug and request them to not go ahead to apply the patch. At the same time, we point out the correct fixing of the bug and provide our proper patch. In all the three cases, maintainers explicitly acknowledged and confirmed to not move forward with the incorrect patches. This way, we ensure that the incorrect patches will not be adopted or committed into the Git tree of Linux.

      https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf

      > If it quacks like a duck and waddles like a duck, then it is a duck.

      A lot of horrible things have happened on the Internet by following that philosophy. I think it's imperative to learn the rigorous facts and different interpretations of them, or we will continue to great harm and be easily manipulated.

    • ltfishApr 2021

      Some clarifications since they are unclear in the original report.

      - Aditya Pakki (the author who sent the new round of seemingly bogus patches) is not involved in the S&P 2021 research. This means Aditya is likely to have nothing to do with the prior round of patching attempts that led to the S&P 2021 paper.

      - According to the authors' clarification [1], the S&P 2021 paper did not introduce any bugs into Linux kernel. The three attempts did not even become Git commits.

      Greg has all reasons to be unhappy since they were unknowingly experimented on and used as lab rats. However, the round of patches that triggered his anger *are very likely* to have nothing to do with the three intentionally incorrect patch attempts leading to the paper. Many people on HN do not seem to know this.

      [1] https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf

    • nkurzApr 2021

      > The IRB of University of Minnesota reviewed the procedures of the experiment and determined that this is not human research.

      I'm not sure how it affects things, but I think it's important to clarify that they did not obtain the IRB-exempt letter in advance of doing the research, but after the ethically questionable actions had already been taken:

      The IRB of UMN reviewed the study and determined that this is not human research (a formal IRB exempt letter was obtained). Throughout the study, we honestly did not think this is human research, so we did not apply for an IRB approval in the beginning. ... We would like to thank the people who suggested us to talk to IRB after seeing the paper abstract.

      https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~kjlu/papers/clarifications-hc.pdf

    Related

    Grsecurity Bloggrsecurity.net83 people

    Important Notice Regarding Public Availability of Stable Patches

    Grsecurity Blog
    Company · last shared 2026
    Yifan Luyifan.lu19 people

    Kindle Touch jail broken via ID3 Tag

    Yifan Lu
    Personal · last shared 2026
    Project Zerogoogleprojectzero.blogspot.com550 people

    Reading privileged memory with a side-channel

    Project Zero
    Company · last shared 2025
    Kernel.org Peoplepeople.kernel.org71 people

    How many kinds of USB-C to USB-C cables are there?

    Kernel.org People
    Publication · last shared 2026
    Greg Kroah-Hartmankroah.com84 people

    Meltdown and Spectre Linux kernel status

    Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Personal · last shared 2026
    Yann Colletfastcompression.blogspot.com59 people

    XXH3 – a new speed-optimized hash algorithm

    Yann Collet
    Personal · last shared 2025
    WeLiveSecuritywelivesecurity.com206 people

    LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group

    WeLiveSecurity
    Company · last shared 2026
    Alex Ionescualex-ionescu.com18 people

    Windows Internals, 7th Edition

    Alex Ionescu
    Personal · last shared 2023