PrivSec

They have this completely backwards.

GrapheneOS provides much better privacy than CalyxOS including features like Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, Network toggle instead of the leaky LineageOS approach, per-connection MAC randomization, fixes for many data leaks and much more.

GrapheneOS provides much broader app compatibility than CalyxOS via sandboxed Google Play. Apps forbidding using an alternate OS via the Play Integrity API is an issue for any alternate operating system and it's known that spoofing the device integrity check for Google certification is not a sustainable approach that will keep working. It already doesn't work consistently.

CalyxOS is not a hardened OS. It greatly reduces security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, rolled back security and slow patches.

Compatibility with Android apps on GrapheneOS is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:

https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play

Can run the vast majority of Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not CalyxOS with the problematic microG approach.

https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-based-operating-system/ is an article with more long form comparisons between OSes.

As much as I'd love to daily drive an OS like GrapheneOS, the risk of running into apps that use Google Integrity API thereby making it impossible to run those apps on Graphene is too much of an inconvenience.

I took a look at this curated list of bank apps[1] supported on Graphene OS and I'm glad that a large majority of them work on Graphene. However, just my luck that one of the banks I use on this list isn't supported.

In my country, the state is enforcing a lot of essential workflows to be digital-first (and in extreme cases digital-exclusive) and I dread to think needing these services at a crticial moment and the choice of my OS making it impossible for me. This is more of a commentary on my government's choices but it's a reality for me.

In any case, I don't think it's practical to go cold turkey and switch to a privacy focused phone without testing waters first to see which of your of workflows break and then reason about the tradeoffs/workarounds.

I do admire folks who use GrapheneOS as a daily driver, I'd like to chat them up if I find them in the wild.

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compatibility-with-grapheneos/

> my main worry is about banking and NFC

This may be useful: https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compatibility-with-grapheneos/

> I also worry about the future of Graphene with AOSP going more closed/private

I don't think it's AOSP going more closed, but rather the evolution of the Pixels line. GrapheneOS wants the ability to unlock the bootloader, install their own key and relock the bootloader. Google could technically stop supporting that for the Pixels (just like many (most?) manufacturers do), but they haven't said anything about it.

GrapheneOS has mentioned talks with a major manufacturer. I wonder if it will be a Graphene phone (which sounds very tricky) or if it could be something like Huawei or Samsung offering to unlock/relock the bootloader and committing to providing the features necessary for GrapheneOS. The latter would be amazing.

> OSMAnd was the one I tried and it bordered on unusable.

I love it. But if that's your feeling, definitely try CoMaps: in terms of UX it's on the other end of the spectrum :-).

Time estimate depends heavily on the apps you use (data migration in them) and maybe some features that don't easily work out-of-the-box in GOS like Google's find my device, where you'd ideally migrate to use foss alternatives like FMD[1]. For the easiest setup by far just install the sandboxed Google Play Store and get your apps from there. In general the more additional security features you enable, the more issues you may face, so I'd recommend leaving everything to GOS default, like leaving Sensors permission ON by default. There are a few gotchas that may not be mentioned in GOS official documentation or elsewhere such as BT tracker devices not being supported for the most part, requiring workarounds. There are also few apps that don't currently support GOS [2][3], so be sure to check them out beforehand.

1: https://gitlab.com/fmd-foss/fmd-android

2: https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide#apps-banning-grapheneos

3: https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compatibility-with-grapheneos/

Yes, I find it much easier to set up and use than any other Android phone. There’s less bloatware, and battery life is noticeably better.

Two tips for beginners:

Google Play Store and Google Play Services can be installed from the App Store. They aren’t included by default because GrapheneOS works fine without them.

If a trusted app has trouble running, try enabling Exploit protection compatibility mode on the app’s Info screen (long-press the app icon → Info → Exploit protection).

Check whether your bank is supported: https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compatibility-with-grapheneos/. If it isn’t, it likely depends on the Play Integrity API, which means it requires customers to stay under constant surveillance by the world’s largest advertising company, with no real security justification (see https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide). In that case, you should switch to a more trustworthy bank.

The person you replied to is right, the "security" of Linux might as well be nonexistent compared to macOS and especially iOS/Android. Even the developers of Secureblue (https://secureblue.dev/) state that despite their hardening and mitigations Linux still lags far behind macOS (and possibly Windows) security-wise. The only Linux derivative that has proper security is Android, and even better GrapheneOS.

https://privsec.dev/posts/linux/linux-insecurities/

https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html

I also commented here on Linux phones, the same can apply to Linux as a desktop OS: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46997397

Also on top of that Linux/Windows laptops also lack the hardware-backed security that Macs and to an extent some Chromebooks have.