The University of Cambridge security group, including Ross Anderson, writes about security research, payment card flaws, and hardware attacks.
Commenters hold it in high regard, pointing to its work on Chip and PIN and card payment weaknesses, and ask when it went offline.
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/03/09/video-eavesdropping-demo-at-cebit-2006/
Rather old one, where 25m was claimed. (Markus Kuhn).
Some like 200m were claimed by anons in random threads (https://www.mikrocontroller.net/topic/319197, in german), but that might have been related to CRT, not sure. They said they pointed antennas towards an office building.
All in all, the topic seems valid but unfortunately the discussions tend to be trolled.
One takeaway from the original link for me was to prefer displayport cable over hdmi/dvi. Yet, if the shielded connectors you have been referring to are easy to find, sounds good as well.
Absolute security is not possible, they say. Yet I wonder, can we have some sort of it at least outside a horizon of lets say 5 meters? Broadcasting the signals few meters/across the street/100m seem to be quite of a difference.
Imagine?
> This week brought an announcement from a banking association that “identity fraud” is soaring to new levels, with 89,000 cases reported in the first six months of 2017 and 56% of all fraud reported by its members now classed as “identity fraud”.
> So what is “identity fraud”? The announcement helpfully clarifies the concept:
> “The vast majority of identity fraud happens when a fraudster pretends to be an innocent individual to buy a product or take out a loan in their name.
> Now back when I worked in banking, if someone went to Barclays, pretended to be me, borrowed £10,000 and legged it, that was “impersonation”, and it was the bank’s money that had been stolen, not my identity. How did things change?
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2017/08/26/is-the-city-force-corrupt-or-just-clueless/
Further more, any contact tracing app that uses a technological solution is limited in its usefulness anyway. Viral transmission is not well modelled by radio packet transmission. Bruce Schneier has views on this [1], as do the Uni of Cambridge Digital Research team who consulted on the NHS app [2].
In fact, this is a benefit of the centralised matching model proposed by the NHS. The algorithm, eg number of packets received, time window in which they are received, can be tailored to improve the model.
But in any case, using Bluetooth to model virus transmission risks becoming a massive red herring.
[1] - https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covad-19_.html
[2] - https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world/
Interestingly (on reflection, not surprisingly) since going back to RSS, I've been reading a lot more from sites with expert content, but ugly typography.
- Math Babe (https://mathbabe.org)
+ Superb musings and coverage on the societal
impact of everything becoming a prediction
problem (occasional applied technical
discussion)
- Tech Dirt (https://www.techdirt.com/)
+ Lawyers Rule Everything Around Me
- Light Blue Touchpaper (https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org)
+ Thoughts on infosec from Cambridge Computer
Laboratory (influential on policy, excellent
coverage of conferences)
- Muckrock (https://www.muckrock.com/)
+ News from the FOIA wars
> a paper voting system that is easier to verify and audit
Couldn't agree more.
It's interesting that voter fraud used to be a "left-wing conspiracy theory", given that Cheney had ties to Diebold (e.g. see https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/who-is-counting-your-vote-diebold-and-bush-vs-the-public-interest/).
And prior to this election cycle there was more concern from the Democrats around potential Russian interference with voting machines.
Perhaps now we'll have bipartisan support for what should be apolitical and uncontroversial election security initiatives that researchers have been advocating for years, e.g. https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/11/26/three-paper-thursday-veni-vidi-vote-y-election-security/.
Probably not. What is your threat model?
Full disk encryption only solves part of an overall threat model. The biggest difference between VeraCrypt and FileVault is that one is open source and auditable. FileVault does have some publicly available technical whitepapers, however Apple has not released the source code.
So aside from black box testing FileVault itself, you’ll just have to trust that the engineers at Apple did a good job.
Otherwise the differences are largely the same: how long is your passphrase, where do you store that, etc.
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/08/06/analysis-of-f...
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf