Freedom to Tinker

Are you aware that the "my homebrew crypto system is functionally equivalent to a one-time pad, and is therefore perfect" argument is so overused by cranks that it's considered a cliche among actual cryptographers?

[1] https://twitter.com/mattblaze/status/580823914340880384

[2] https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/1999/0215.html#snakeoil (#6)

[3] https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/03/25/be-wary-of-one-time-pads-and-other-crypto-unicorns/

[4] http://maldr0id.blogspot.com/2015/05/crystalline-cipher-and-cryptography.html

I don't even know how to respond anymore. You must be trolling.

Key-stretching algorithms are better than your chain-of-hashes because each iteration of a key-stretcher is deliberately CPU and memory intensive, whereas hashes are designed to be fast and efficient. So whatever clever scheme you think you've come up with to turn a single letter into an adequate key using secret combinations of chained hashes -- congratulations... you're doing what a key-stretcher does, but badly, because your scheme is much easier to brute-force.

Look, there are a lot of really subtle things that you need to be aware of when designing cryptosystems that even professional cryptographers get wrong sometimes, and exploiting these mistakes in a way that results in a complete break is way easier and more common than most people think. This is why "Don't roll your own crypto" is considered a best practice. Not because it isn't possible to come up with a simpler scheme.…

I may be wrong, but it's more than just a random feeling. I should also point out that I'm not suggesting that all data should always be released. And also I'll reiterate that it's not just 'randomwalker' I'm referring to here. I'm disappointed that the paper he's rebutting seems to be making the silly claim that 'it's safe' instead of 'it's a worthwhile risk'.

The case I'm most familiar with is the Netflix Prize. I think I can safely say (in my semi-professional opinion) that a lot of good research was published as a result of Netflix's decision to release the data that they did: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=netflix

I view these publications as a public good. It's possible the techniques described were previously known privately, but before the contest there was no description of them in the available literature. At the conclusion of the contest, Netflix briefly announced that they would have a second contest, which would involve the release of another data set. In large part as a result of the press coverage of randomwalker's work, this potential release was cancelled: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/paul/netflix-cancels-netflix-prize-2/

It's disputable, but I feel this additional data set would have generated a similar number of good publications, inspired new research, spread knowledge, and offered a similar benefit to the public.

It can be argued that preventing further data releases has prevented further harm to the public. But I think it's…

Thanks for these links, usually when talking about it not being decentralized the source is either Forbes or Business Insider. Let's see what your sources have in store.

EDIT:

[0] https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.03998

Good paper, lots of good research. Identifies that top pools do not change position too often. Shows also that system profits prefer higher pool sizes.

However, fails to notice that pools are made of individual miners/groups and do not represenet single huge datacenters. Groups/individuals can often change pools, and this is not an uncommon practive.

[1] https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/07/28/analyzing-the-2013-...

First thing to note is that this is 2013, when the bitcoin world was a lot more centralized (Only one major exchange, MT.Gox, much less visbiiltiy and credibility. I argue that more coverage results in a more decentralized system)

Also, this is not really a decision of centralization, but feels akin to an UN meeting, where multiple actors discuss rationally the best course of action for their community, and then move in regards to that course. No one forced the community to follow their moves, but when they did, the results were better for the whole community.

Of course, if they had not given advice from an authoritarian position, nobody might have listened. Yet, still Bitcoin would have survived, as explained by Buterin: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-network-shaken-by-blockchain-fork-1363144448/

[2]…

It's sorta up for debate.

My understanding, which is tiny and very limited, is that you can think of the role of finance operators as "liquidity providers". They're the grease in the wheels of capitalism; by either providing access to capital (via loans, or investment) or by matching buyers with sellers.

A classical example is you're a farmer that wants to hedge the risk that your crop will fail due to random weather events or that there will be such a glut in the market that you won't be able to sell your crop profitably. So, you enter a contract to sell your crop at a fixed rate long before harvest comes along. That's a future contract, and it's a kind of derivative.

So, derivatives can be really socially useful instruments. They can act like certain kinds of insurance, or allow you to capture different dimensions of value on assets that you already own.

However, and here's where the argument comes in, it's not clear that all kinds of derivatives provide socially useful forms of gambling. The prime example here is that of the collateralized debt obligation in which huge portions of the US mortgage market got sunk into.

Mortgage backed securities are probably not in of themselves terrible ideas but the way CDOs were structured made it impossible to objectively value the risk behind the instrument. It's just not clear how a dip in the market might affect the value of your CDO tranche. It's actually an np-complete problem -…

Everything we do in life relies on a trust system more or less. Reproducible build only guarantees integrity, not the trustworthiness of the code.

> There is no way for anyone to know what all this code is doing, there is little way to verify updates and its simply untenable.

Because few people have time to read source code. Take Django as an example. Big community, lots of contributors. Can we say we should trust the code because the number of eyes? Probably, but not always.

Why? We can overlook and pretend the code is legitmate. Take Linux kernel or some of the crypto projects out there. A lot of unreadable old tricks made backdoor really easy. [1] is interesting because someone apparently made an authorized changeset to BitKeeper. Are you going to read JRE code to make sure no backdoor? Nah.

Is there a solution? Nope and will never have a solution. The best one can do is using a DVCS to prevent unathorized changeset (provided every contributor does a sanity check for pulling in changeset) and trust the community. No machine can distinugish a good code from a bad code. Humans can't even tell unless raising a red flag.

Sometimes change of project ownership can also introduce some uncertainty, but that is a rare case for major projects.

I am pretty confident there are code in the Linux kernel no one has ever touched or ever read for years.

[1]: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2013/10/09/the-linux-backdoor-attempt-of-2003/

The best overview of this mess is from Cory Doctorow, who notes that while the claims of fraud in this election are garbage, the voting machines, and especially overused Ballot-marking devices (BMDs), are also hugely problematic.

Voting machines didn’t steal the election. But they’re a terrible technology. - The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/03/voting-machines-election-steal-conspiracy-flaws/

And worst of all is ES&S' threats against folks who point out those legitimate flaws, e.g. SMART Elections, a journalism and advocacy group in NY.

ESS voting machine company sends threats
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2021/01/11/ess-voting-machine-company-sends-threats/

What we need is evidence-based elections:

Evidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trail, then Audit
Andrew W. Appel* & Philip B. Stark* Georgetown Law Technology Review 2020
https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/4.2-p523-541-Appel-Stark.pdf

And though we have improving evidence for correct tabulations in the recent elections, many states still aren't doing a good job providing evidence for ballot eligibility or chain-of-custody.

The best way to promote confidence in our democracy is to calmly stick to facts, not be swayed by politics, and work to make things better. For more on how we've done that in Colorado and elsewhere, see my page at http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/elections/corla/