Qualys Security Labs, home of SSL Labs, posts on TLS configuration, cipher weaknesses, and web server hardening.
HN links it as a reference on SSL/TLS deployment, especially forward secrecy setup for Apache and Nginx and the RC4 deprecation.
The last thing we were keeping it around for was the extension support, but they unfortunately killed that so I now recommend Edge over Firefox for resource-constrained systems. It's not there yet, but it's got a brighter future than Firefox.
But yeah nothing pissed me off more than them saying they support choice when they kill off well-supported standards they don't like [1], fire employees over their (common) religious beliefs [2], take the longest to roll out critical security features [3], and prioritize shitty UI updates that nearly everyone hates [4].
All I keep hearing is that the new multi-process is so much faster, everything is great now, but every time I run it on fairly decent systems (i7 from late 2013) it takes multiple seconds to switch tabs.
It really is a joke that their head of marketing wasn't fired for that post, it only supports the true thing that Mozilla has come to stand for: hypocrisy.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_SQL_Database
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brendan_Eich
[3] https://community.qualys.com/thread/12421
[4] https://www.ghacks.net/2013/11/23/80-unhappy-firefoxs-australis-interface-mozilla-report-states/
A couple points:
* !RC4 - RC4 is in doubt[1]. The only reason to keep it around was to mitigate the BEAST attack, which is now mitigated[2] client side, so RC4 should be dropped.
* gzip off; - Explicitly disable gzip compression to avoid BREACH[3]
* Ensure TLS deflate is off to mitigate CRIME[4] (this is the default in most, but not all combinations of nginx/OpenSSL).
* openssl ciphers -v is great for testing what ciphers match your settings.
* Comment your nginx config! You will not remember all of this when you next look at it (or someone else does). And some of it will certainly be outdated. Security is not a static game.
[1] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/09/06/nsa_cryptobreaking_bullrun_analysis/
[2] https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/09/10/is-beast-still-a-threat
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BREACH_%28security_exploit%29
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_%28security_exploit%29
Interesting. It looks like the page itself is encrypted with more standard crypto using AES [0], but the video itself is served from a connection using RC4 [1].
As far as I can tell from this article [2], attacks on RC4 are only theoretical at this point, but it seems reasonable that they should upgrade the video serving domain to be consistent with the page itself (though maybe it's done for performance reasons - either encrypting a large video stream costs a lot of CPU time or decrypting it on the client is too slow or CPU intensive for watching video smoothly, so perhaps they are sticking with RC4 for a good reason). Still, as my old crypto prof said, "Attacks only get better over time. They never get worse."
[0]: http://i.imgur.com/OcpziFa.png
[1]: http://i.imgur.com/57T8bay.png
[2]: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/rc4-in-tls-is-broken-now-what
> 155a7a01308fa0807f722c5984bd91fb
You may want to read the last phrase of my comment.
> I find "high-end graphic card (~$500) can compute 10 billion md5 hashes per second" a bit unbelievable
And yet those are the numbers oclhashcat lite publishes for 0.10 on a stock Radeon HD6990 (10886.3M c/s): http://hashcat.net/oclhashcat-lite/
> Yes I realise that md5'ed password strings aren't random
Which is the whole point, and the knowledge the tools I mentioned use: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2012/06/08/lessons-learned-from-cracking-2-million-linkedin-passwords (note: the article is about sha1 hashes — which are about 3 times as expensive to compute as md5 — and is done on an older CPU, not GPU-assisted hashing)
> Just saying.
Just saying absolutely nothing?
HSTS is currently used by 2.8% of all websites, up from 1.2% this time last year. [1] If people are using Qualys SSL Labs tool to check their "grade", they won't be awarded an A+ grade unless their HSTS max-age is at least 6 months [2], so I'm going to assume the average is somewhere close to that due to how common usage of that tool is.
My grandma still uses browser bookmarks, but I have no none-anecdotal source for this.
BoA could absolutely do all the things you just mentioned, but all of them are more difficult than simply replacing their certificate using Comodo or some other trusted root CA.
[1] https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-hsts/all/all
[2] https://community.qualys.com/thread/15972
So is that the point you were originally trying to make instead of discussing etymology? While we're quibbling prescriptively about terminology, I'd argue that the IE exploit patched earlier this week was in fact a zero day since it was not public knowledge.
> The vulnerability underlying CVE-2013-3897 was found internally at Microsoft and would have been fixed in MS13-080. However, in the last two weeks, attacks against the same vulnerability became public, but since the fix was in the code already, it enabled Microsoft to address the vulnerability, CVE-2013-3897, in record time.
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2013/10/08/patch-tuesday-october-2013 (unnecessary text omitted)