Matthew Green

Same here. It may be basic and crappy, but if you want to read an unsuccessful blog with no attempt at monetization or ads or even visitor counting, mine[1] is where you should feel right at home.

But I guess the author means a platform, not loose websites without a collective 'new' feed. I remember looking for one when wanting to make a new blog and I haven't found a platform that felt right, at least back then (probably ~2015). Heck, I couldn't even find software to install: everything is either super heavy stuff that requires caching or at least a beefy CPU to survive the HN homepage (with custom software, HN can be survived on an ancient Atom CPU even if you use PHP (also pre-PHP7) and do multiple SQL queries per pageload) or some static generators that I wasn't looking for.

Edit: While we're at it, another blog I read is Robert Heaton's one[2], and I'm subscribed to a few others but they don't seem to post anymore since I stopped getting email notifications. I remember Coding Horror[3] was also nice to read but he posts very infrequently now (for those who don't know, that's by the co-founder of Stack Overflow). Finally, Cryptography Engineering[4] might be nice if you're into that sort of thing. But I suppose those can all be mostly considered successful in that they all have a following.

[1] https://lucgommans.nl/blog

[2] https://robertheaton.com

[3] https://blog.codinghorror.com

[4] https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com

Edit: The comment below is incorrect. I'm leaving it for transparency, but I misread where the padding is being applied.

I could be missing something here, but I think this is vulnerable to DO'1985, a/k/a Desmedt-Odlyzko:

https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/blob/8e67756ebce780c91b8c2ffc7db1f6230f8a9419/src/crypto/rsa.rs#L172-L178

In particular, in the presence of an insufficiently wide hash, the absence of padding here means that RSA signature validation is not secure under EUF-CMA. Matt Green has a great post on why and when EUF-CMA matters[1].

(This isn't necessarily this implementation's fault, since PGP seemingly (!) encourages the stripping of padding from signatures. But I can't find another source for whether this is actually encouraged by OpenPGP, or whether implementations just widely allow it.)

[1]: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/euf-cma-and-suf-cma/

Hi Josh, thanks for taking the time!

My question, to both you and (especially) Moxie: Why do you trust Intel SGX so much (for Signal but now also MobileCoin)? Why are you not worried about vulnerabilities? As you're surely aware, even Matt Green who is/used to be(?) the biggest fan of Signal[0] is very concerned[1] about SGX. I don't question your intentions but the fact that Signal as an organization has stayed completely silent about this is… worrisome and at the very least taints its reputation of openness and trustworthiness. With MobileCoin now relying on it, too (more or less), this only seems to be getting worse.

[0]: http://web.archive.org/web/20200201112751/https://signal.org/

[1]: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/07/10/a-few-thoughts-about-signals-secure-value-recovery/

Yes, see my link to the BULLRUN program. There were quite a few follow-ups as well.

[1] https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/10/14/how-is-nsa-breaking-so-much-crypto/

[2] https://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/how-the-nsa-can-break-trillions-of-encrypted-web-and-vpn-connections/

[3] https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/03/how-does-nsa-break-ssl/

And so on and so forth.

Also keep in mind that they are retaining a full take online-- storing all traffic on the internet. Even if it can't be decrypted in realtime, they can come back to it in, say 10 years, with all the advancements in brute forcing and potentially quantum computing available in 2027, to take a look at your 2017 activity. The emails you wrote, the websites you visited, all your chats, all your searches, saved forever.

> That's the Menezes and Koblitz argument from the "Enigma" paper […]

PDF:

> In August 2015 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) released a major policy statement on the need for post-quantum cryp- tography (PQC). This announcement will be a great stimulus to the development, standardization, and commercialization of new quantum- safe algorithms. However, certain peculiarities in the wording and tim- ing of the statement have puzzled many people and given rise to much speculation concerning the NSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and quantum-safe cryptography. Our purpose is to attempt to evaluate some of the theories that have been proposed.

* https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018.pdf

Then-coverage:

* https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/22/a-riddle-wrapped-in-curve/

Here are a few prominent cryptographers in the 'cryptocurrency' scene with 'deep knowledge':

Matthew Green from John Hopkins University [0]

Zhenfei Zhang of Ethereum, Mina, Algorand blockchains who co-created the NIST post-quantum cryptography standard for digital signatures called Falcon [1]

Nadim Kobeissi creator of cryptocat now created Capsule Social [2]

Silvio Micali, Turing Award Winner for his work on Zero-Knowledge Proofs [3]

So, I'm afraid that there are some credible people like those above who have a significant and documented background in cryptography who are also working in the cryptocurrency industry.

[0] https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/

[1] https://falcon-sign.info/

[2] https://nadim.computer/

[3] http://people.csail.mit.edu/silvio/